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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTERN REGIONAL OFF-TRACK 
BETTING CORPORATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, LOCAL 222, 
Charging Party. 
MOOT, SPRAGUE, MARCY, LANDY, FERNBACH & 
SMYTHE, ESQS, (JOHN B. DENNING, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
DAVIDSON, FINK, COOK & GATES, ESQS., for 
Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 222 (SEIU). On its face, it merely 
alleges a contract violation by the employer, Western Regional 
Off-Track Betting Corporation (OTB). Charging party asserts that 
the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding which, 
inter alia, limited the number of "buddy parlors" that OTB could 
operate and guaranteed the presence of a branch manager at each 
branch. The creation of a "buddy parlor" involves the combination 
of two branches, thereby reducing the number of supervisors 
required by OTB. The charge further states that, after it ratified', 
the agreement, OTB opened more "buddy parlors" than were authorized 
by the agreement and that it also opened a "mini parlor" which did 
not require a full complement of supervisory employees.As 
specified in the charge, the relief sought by SEIU is an order ; 
#2A-12/18/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-5408 
Board - U-5408 -2 
requiring OTB to comply with the parties'agreement. 
Noting that SEIU had initiated a grievance dealing with the 
same subject matter as that dealt with in the charge, OTB urged 
the hearing officer to defer consideration of the issue to the 
arbitration process. It also argued that the alleged memorandum 
of understanding had never been accepted by the parties and, 
therefore, could not have been violated by it. Based upon this 
part of OTB's response, SEIU argued to the hearing officer that 
she should not defer consideration of the charge to the arbitra-
tion process because OTB was repudiating the memorandum of 
understanding and that such repudiation constituted an improper 
practice that could not be reached by an arbitrator. It did not, 
however, seek to amend its charge to assert that OTB had repudiated 
the memorandum of understanding and there is no indication in 
the record whether such an amendment would have been timely.— 
Finding that the charge pleaded only a contractual dispute, 
the hearing officer dismissed the charge subject to its recon-
sideration in accordance with the standards set forth in New York 
City Transit Authority, 4 PERB 113031 (1971). SEIU takes exception 
to this decision and supports its position by reasserting the 
argument that an arbitration award could not possibly reach the 
2/ question whether OTB repudiated its agreement.— 
—Like the charge itself, an amendment of a charge that raises new 
issues may only complain about matters that occurred within four 
months thereof. 
—The hearing officer also disposed of Case No. U-5409, a related 
case involving the same parties. As no exceptions were filed in 
that case, her disposition of it is not before us. 
Board - U-5408 -3 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the charge 
merely alleges a contract violation. Although SEIU's briefs to 
the hearing officer and to us both raise a question as to whether 
OTB repudiated a memorandum of understanding, that question is 
not raised by SEIU's charge. We have held that a charging party 
is bound by its charge.and "will not find an improper practice 
-which--is—no t;a!^ 
City of Mount Vernon,. 14 PERB 1[3037 (1981) at p. 3063. The 
doctrine of deferral is not applicable when no improper practice 
is alleged in a charge. The hearing officer should, therefore, 
have dismissed the charge outright because this Board does not 
"have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee organization and shall 
not exercise• jurisdiction over an alleged viola-
tion of such an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper. . .practice." Section 
.205,5(d) of the Taylor Law. 3/ 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: December 17, 1981 
Albany, New York 
^Harold R. "Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus," Member 
avid C. 'Randies, Member 
3/ See also St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1(3058 (1977) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES OF SULLIVAN COUNTY, 
Employer, 
•and-
SULLIVAN COUNTY LOCAL 853, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
#2B-i2/l8/81 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-2211 
ROSENBERG & UFBERG, ESOS. (SHELDON 
ROSENBERG, ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESOS. 
(WILLIAM M. WALLENS, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Petitioner 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services of Sullivan County (BOCES) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation that Sullivan County Local 853, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., (CSEA) is entitled to be certified 
as the exclusive negotiating representative of two units of 
employees of BOCES. 
By the petition herein, which was filed on February 2, 1981, 
CSEA sought certification in a single unit of employees of BOCES-.—' 
As BOCES questioned the appropriateness of the proposed negotiating 
—The unit sought consisted of: 
"teacher assistants, teacher aides, home-school 
coordinator,- typists,' stenographer, clerk of the 
BOCES Board, treasurer, account clerk, superintendent 
of buildings and grounds (head custodian), custodians, 
cleaners, laborers, electrician, cafeteria manager and 
food service helpers." 
Board - C-2211 -2 
unit, the matter was sent to hearing, and on September 22, 1981, 
the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation determined that there should be three negotiating 
2/ 
units.— He then ordered that there be an election in each of 
the. units : 
• - - - - « - : - . uM"es-B"~th"e~L^ 
from the date of receipt of this decision evidence 
to satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the 
Rules for certification without an election."3/ 
CSEA disclaimed any interest in representing Unit 3 and 
sought certification without an election in the other two units. 
As the designation cards submitted by CSEA as its showing of 
interest were more than six months old by that time, it obtained 
2/ 
— The three units were defined as follows: 
"Unit 1-Included: 
Unit 2-Included: 
Unit 3-Included: 
Excluded: 
All full-time employees as follows: 
teacher aide, typist, stenographer, 
custodian, cleaner, laborer, electrician, 
food service helper and full-time CETA 
employees in those job titles. 
All full-time employees as follows: 
teacher assistant, home-school coordinator. 
All full-time employees as follows: 
superintendent of buildings and grounds 
(head custodian), cafeteria manager. 
Clerk of the BOCES board, treasurer, 
account clerk and all other employees." 
^Rule 201.9(g)(1) provides: 
"Certification without an election. If the choice avail-
able to the employees in a negotiating unit is limited 
to the selection or rejection of a single employee 
organization, that choice may be ascertained by the 
Director on the basis of dues deduction authorizations 
and other evidences instead of by an election. In such 
a case, the employee organization involved will be 
certified without an election if a majority of the 
employees within the unit have indicated their choice 
by the execution of dues deduction authorization cards 
which are current, or by individual designation cards 
which have been executed within six months prior to 
the certification." 
Board - C-2211 
-3 
new designation cards, all of which were obtained between 
September 24 and September 28, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) determined that there were 39 employees in Unit 1 
and that 27 of them had signed current authorization cards 
indicating-their - des-i-re -1o -be -r epresented -by -GSEA,- ---He--further--
determined that there were eight employees in Unit 2, five of whom 
.had signed current authorization cards indicating their desire 
to be represented by CSEA. 
BOCES now argues that the Director erred in determining that 
27 of 39 employees in the first unit had indicated their support 
of CSEA. In support of this argument, it submits a document 
which it asserts to be a letter dated April 23, 1981 that indi-
cates that seven of the unit employees who had previously signed 
showing of interest designation cards repudiated those cards. 
This document is not part of the record before us as it was never 
submitted as evidence in the proceeding. BOCES further argues 
4/ that the unit consists of 42 rather than 39 employees.— Thus, 
according to BOCES, CSEA merely established support from 20 of 
42 unit employees and is not entitled to certification without 
an election. 
As the document purporting to show the withdrawal of support 
for CSEA by seven unit employees was not submitted to the Director 
and is not a pa r t of the record in the proceeding, i t could not have 
—This is based on two letters sent to the Acting Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation; one on 
October 16, 1981, five days before the Director issued his 
decision, and the other on October 29, 1981, which was after 
the issuance of that- decision. 
Board - C-2211 .4 I 
been considered by him, and cannot be considered by us in1 j 
s 
reviewing the correctness of his action. Moreover, the letter 1 
i 
would, in any event, be immaterial as the record shows that the \ 
designation cards relied upon by the Director for certification I 
without an election were new. current cards executed many months 
after the alleged letter. Accordingly, CSEA would be.entitled' i 
I 
td--ee*t fcfiea^on-wi A ^ 
BOCES' factual assertions were accepted as true. 
With respect to Unit 2, BOCES argues that the execution'of 
designation cards by five of eight unit employees merely gives 
CSEA a majority of one, and that a.majority of one should not be 
deemed sufficient for certification without an election. There 
is no basis for this position in the Rules or decisions of this 
Board, and we reject it, 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER, that the exceptions herein be, and 
they hereby are, DISMISSED. 
DATED: December 17, 1981 
Albany, New York 
arold R, Newman, chairman 
Ida Kiaus. Member 
CAt 
David C. Randies, Member 
% i'7223 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
• In the Matter of 
l', BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
:' OF SULLIVAN COUNTY, 
Employer, 
-and-
SULLIVAN COUNTY LOCAL 853, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
Case No. c-2211 
-CERTIFICATION -OF REPRESENTATIVE AKD ORDER
 :TO_NEGOTIATE^ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
;•• above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
; Rules of.Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
.i negotiating representative has been selected, ., • 
|! Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
jj Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
\\- IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Sullivan County Local 853, 
J!Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
i; has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
i\ of the. above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
ii as their exclusive representative for the- purpose of collective 
•; negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit<l):Included: All full-time employees as. follows: 
teacher aide, typist, stenographer, 
custodian, cleaner, laborer, electrician, 
food service helper and full-time CETA 
employees in those job titles. 
Excluded: Clerk of the BOCES board, treasurer, 
account clerk and all other employees. 
I: Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named' public employer 
ji shall' negotiate collectively with Sullivan County Local 853, Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms.and conditions of employment, and shall 
j negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
;> ^yOOfi \ • determination of, and administration of, grievances.' 
!! Signed on the 17th day of December , 1981 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus;, Member ' 
David C. Randies, Hembe. 
PERB 5 8.4 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
OF SULLIVAN COUNTY, 
Employer, 
-and-
SULLIVAN COUNTY LOCAL 853, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
Case No. C-2211 
-CERTIFICATIOJ^OTi^JLRESJiNTM^ 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by.the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
.
:
 negotiating representative has been selected, 
:
: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by.the 
ij Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
ii ' • 
M IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Sullivan County Local 853.,. 
;] Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
:
 I ; 
i; has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
I; of the above named public employer, in the unit .described below, 
ij as their exclusive representative-for the purpose of collective 
•: negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit (2 ):Included: All full-time-employees as follows: 
teacher assistant, home-school 
coordinator. 
Excluded: Clerk of the BOCES board, treasurer, 
account clerk and all other employees. 
]; Further, IT IS ORDERED, that the above named public employer' 
|: shall negotiate collectively with Sullivan County Local 853, 
|-Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.. 
I' and-enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
• with regard to terms and conditions.of employment, and shall 
(negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 17th day of December , 19 81 
Tarold R. Newman, Chairman": 
Ida KlaiiS, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
PERB 58.4 /"7225 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS/ INC.,' 
Respondent, 
-and-
CHARLES R. IDEN, 
Charging Party, 
//2C-12/18/81 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4991 
BERNARD Fc ASEE, ESQ, (IVOR R, MOSKOWITZ, ESQ,, 
of Counsel, for Respondent 
STUART A0 ROSENFELDT, ESQ., for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of both the charging | 
party (Iden) and the respondent (UUP) to a hearing officer's 
decision which dismissed in part and sustained in part an 
improper practice charge against the respondent0 No hearing was 
held since the hearing officer concluded that there was no 
factual disputeo 
UUP is the certified bargaining agent for the unit which 
includes Iden. He, as a non-member of UUP, pays agency fees to 
UUP pursuant to CSL §208=3(a). Iden applied for and received a 
refund forthe 1978-79 fiscal year, He pursued the appellate 
steps of UUP' s refund procedure, but when notified of -the date 
and place of the hearing before the neutral - the last step in 
such procedure;-he abandoned the refund procedure and on 
October 8, 1980, filed the instant improper practice charge. 
7226 
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The hearing officer construed the charge as setting forth I 
the following allegations: ! 
1. The UUP agency fee refund procedure for the 
1
 1978-79 fiscal year took longer than the j 
allotted time (August 31, 1980) to be com-
pleted; 
! 
2. UUP has not provided Iden with the infor- | 
of the refunded amount; 1 
3. The selection of the neutral by UUP was 
improper; 
4„ The amount refunded by UUP for 1978-79 
was inadequate; 
5. The selection of the date and the site of j I i 
the hearing was improper„ | 
The hearing officer dismissed all of the allegations except 
the last, on the ground that each such issue had previously been 
decided by the Board and that any further relief can only be 
sought through enforcement of prior PERB orders. She sustained 
that aspect of the charge relating to the selection of the date 
and site of the hearing by the neutral„ 
DISCUSSION 
Upon consideration of the entire record, including the 
exceptions filed by the parties, we conclude that the material 
issues raised in this case are identical to those raised in 
UUP and Barry, Case No„ U-4983, decided concurrently herewith. 
For the reasons set forth in that decision as well as those in 
UUP and Barry, Case No„ U-4775, also decided concurrently with 
this case, we conclude that the aspect of this charge challenging! 
s 
722? 
i 
I 
' I 
Board - U-4991 -3 
the length of time taken to implement and complete the 1978-79 ) 
i 
process should be considered and determined and, accordingly, j 
! 
should be remanded to the hearing officer for hearing and taking 
of evidence. If a violation is found to have occurred, we would 
_
 then~c~o~irs~rd~er~~wK~at:;remeiiia^irct:roh""irs^warrant eu,r —-—--"----:------ — -
• 
For the reasons set forth in the above cited decisions, 
decided concurrently herewith, we reverse the hearing officer and | 
dismiss that aspect of the charge which alleges that the selection 
of the site of the hearing by the neutral was in violation of 
CSL §209-a.2(a). 
For the same reasons set forth in those decisions, we 
affirm the dismissal of all other aspects of the charge herein,, 
In light of this decision, we do not adopt the hearing officer's 
recommended remedy. 
• 
NOW, THEREFORE, we order that 
1. With respect to the aspect of the charge 
relating to the length of time taken to j 
complete the refund procedure, the matter \ 
I 
is remanded to the hearing officer for I 
' I 
action consistent with this decision, j 
and j 
I 
! 
F 
< 
! 
i 
s 
1 
i 
I 
7228 1 
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2. In all other respects the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 17, 1981 
Albany, New York 
Harold R„ Newman, Chairman 
J££J*-M-4-~-
Ida Klaus, Member 
CMS 
"David C Randies TMembe'r 
72?9 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-12/18/8i 
In the Matter of 
PDA'R'P TYKPT^TDN AMD * 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., • _
 0PDE? 
Respondent, : u-4775• ! 
! 
•-and- ' s 
'THOMAS" "CT "BARRYy- ^ -"---—^ -"-—-'" —; -; 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESO. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, j 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent | 
i 
THOMAS C. BARRY, oro se I 
• \ 
I 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C, Barry \ 
I 
to a hearing officer's decision which dismissed his improper I 
v 
practice charge against the United University Professions, Inc. I 
(UUP). j 
UUP is the exclusive negotiating representative of the Profes-j 
• £ 
sional Services Unit of the State University of New York. Pursuant] 
'i 
to §208.3(a) of the Act, UUP receives agency fee deductions from | 
the salaries of unit employees who are not its members. As re- \ 
quired by §208.3(a), UUP has established a procedure under which \ 
agency fee payers may apply for a refund. The procedure provides j 
\ 
•i 
that upon objection made by an agency shop fee payer at the end of j 
i 
UUP's fiscal year, UUP's officers shall determine the amount of the; 
refund. Successive appeals may be taken by a dissatisfied agency \ 
i 
shop fee payer to UUP's Executive Board, Delegate Assembly and a | 
Board - U-4775 
neutral appointed by UUP from a list furnished by the American 
Arbitration Association. 
Barry applied for and received a refund for the 1977-78 
fiscal year. He then exhausted the appellate steps of UUP'1 s 
procedure, which culminated in a decision by a neutral dated 
June 6, 1980. Through all steps, the initial determination was 
affirmed. 
In his charge, filed June 23, 1980, Barry claimed that UUP 
failed to properly maintain its refund procedure and thereby 
violated CSL §209-a.2(a) by: 
1. Refunding an inadequate amount to him for the 
1977-78 fiscal year. 
2. Taking over 21 months, from charging party's 
request for a refund to the decision of the neutral 
to complete the refund procedure. 
3. Not providing him with an explanation or justifi-
cation of the amount refunded when it initially 
made the refund. 
4. Not permitting him to participate in the selection 
of the neutral appointed to review the refund 
determination. 
5. The neutral setting the date and site of the 
hearing without his participation and over his 
objection. 
6. The neutral conducting the hearing in an improper 
manner which was prejudicial to him. 
723 
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i 
7. The neutral issuing a decision five months after 
the hearing. 
8. The neutral incorrectly determining the amount of 
the refund. 
After filing an answer, UUP moved to dismiss the charge 
on various grounds. The hearing officer, without conducting a 
hearing, granted the motion. 
The hearing officer dismissed the complaint relating to the 
amount of refund paid by UUP (Item 1) on the basis of our decision 
in Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB %3018 that we do 
not have jurisdiction to review the correctness of the amount of 
the refund. 
The complaints relating to the duration, of .the. refund 
procedure (Item 2), the failure to provide financial information I 
in support of the refund at the time of refund (Item 3) and the j 
procedure whereby the neutral was selected by UUP without partici-f 
pation by Barry (Item 4) were each dismissed by the hearing officer 
on the basis that each complaint had been the subject of a prior J 
charge decided by this Board ' (UUP_lEson) 12 PERB [^3093;' UUP 
(Barry) 13 PERB [^30.90; and UUP (Eson) 11 PERB. 13074, respective-
ly) • 
As to Item 2, the hearing officer concluded that inasmuch 
as the Board had directed that the 1977-78 refund procedure should! 
by completed by January 31, 1980, any further complaint concerning 
7232 
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l 
I 
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the- duration of- the procedure should be brought to the Board, either 
I 
in a request for an investigation as to compliance with the order f 
T 
in UUP. (Eson) 12 PERB 13093 or a request for institution of a 
proceeding in court pursuant to §213 of the Act to enforce said 
order and,presumably, the seeking of penalties for failure to 
comply ~withTT:he "cmnt "of der^ olJEainecr; Iff "addition^ as^to'Tteml, 'J 
the hearing officer held that the complaint was not timely since 
the charge in this case was not filed until more than four months 
after January 31, 1980, the directed date of completion in our 
prior order. 
As to Item 3, the hearing officer found that we had already 
considered the fact of UUP's failure to provide financial 
information at the time of its 1977-78 refund in UUP (Barry) j 
13 PERB 13090 and, for reasons set forth in that decision, had not 
required such information to be provided for the 1977-78 refund. 
As to Item 4, the hearing officer concluded that inasmuch 
as the Board had, in UUP^ ,_(Eson) 11 PERB 13074, approved the UUP's 
i 
refund procedure which specifically permitted the selection of the j 
I 
neutral by the UUP without any input by the agency fee objector, i 
the complaint in this case as to such procedure should be I 
dismissed. 
s { 
The complaint relating to the neutral's selection of the 
date and site of the hearing without the complainant.' s partici-
pation (Item 5) was dismissed as untimely because the charge 
I herein was filed more than four months after the complainant was \ 
| 
.. "' 7233 | 
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1 
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notified of the action of the neutral„ 
The complaints that the conduct of the hearing by the { 
neutral was improper and prejudicial (Item 6), that a five-month j 
delay between hearing and decision by the neutral was improper I 
(Item 7) and that the amount "of the refund determined to be 
proper by the neutral was incorrect (Item 8) were all dismissed j 
on the basis that the proper way to challenge the neutral's j 
I 
procedural and substantive rulings is through a court proceeding„l 
Barry excepted to all of the hearing officer's rulings. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the hearing officer's dismissal of all items of 
the charge except that relating to Item 2. 
The complaint relating to the correctness of the amount of 
the refund initially paid by UUP (Item 1) was properly dismissed 
by the hearing officer for the reasons set forth in our decision j 1 i n
 Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB 13018„ j 
We also agree that the complaint as to UUP's failure to 
provide financial information in support of the refund at the ] 
time of refund (Item 3) and the procedure whereby the neutral wasj 
selected by UUP without participation by Barry (Item 4) should bej 
i 
! 
dismissed because each of those complaints raises issues which j 
are identical to those dealt with and disposed of in prior 
decisions of this Board„ (UUP (Barry) 13 PERB f3090 and UUP (Eson) 
, : : 
11 PERB'lf3074) . • • 
Those- aspects of the charge relating to the procedural and 
7234 
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substantive rulings of the neutral must also be dismissed,, These 
complaints involve the setting of the date and site of the j 
hearing by the neutral without Barry's participation (Item 5), j 
certain rulings by the neutral, including the refusal to dis- I 
I 
qualify himself, his defining of the issue before him and his 
t 
"view of ~ther scope of: ther ihqurry-^Tt^^ 
took to render his decision (Item 7) and the amount determined 
I 
by him to be refundable (item 8)„ The hearing officer dismissed j 
i 
Item 5 as untimely and the others on the basis that the courts, j 
and not PERB, are the appropriate forum to review the procedural 
1 
and substantive rulings of the neutral„ We affirm their dis-
missal,, 
When we accepted UUP's refund procedure containing review 
by a neutral, we determined that the objector should be free "to 
initiate plenary action regarding the amount of the refund as j 
determined by the neutral party" (UUP (E's'on) 11 PERB at page 
3114), Subsequently, we held that it is the courts, and not 
PERB, that must ultimately review the correctness of the amount 
of the refund (Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB 13018)=] 
On the reasoning of that decision, we now conclude that complaintsr 
concerning the conduct and rulings of the neutral are properly to! 
be dealt with, if at all, in a plenary court action, as they are 
essentially a part;'.of- the- challenge to. the correctness of the;,. j 
amount.of the refund. I 
j 
The allegation of the charge relating to the length of time j 
( 
it took UUP to complete its refund procedure for the year 1977-78j 
36 
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(Item 2) should not be dismissed„ 
The hearing officer dismissed this allegation on two :, 
separate grounds: the inappropriateness of an improper practice 
charge as the vehicle for relief in view of our decision and 
order in UUP • (Esoh) 12 PERB f3093,' and the untimeliness of this 
aspect of the charge„ We reject both of these grounds„ 
--"-•-------•"T-he-hre-a^ ^^  
that his rights were interfered with by the length of time it 
took UUP to complete its refund procedure, could only constitute 
a claim that UUP failed to comply with PERB's prior order. We do 
not so view it„ Our determination in UUP (Es.on) 12 PERB 113093 
does not preclude consideration of this charge„ In that case, 
upon a charge that the basic structural aspects of UUP's refund 
procedure were invalid as,, established, we conducted an investi-
gation as to whether UUP was in compliance with a condition of 
our approval of the basic structural aspects of its refund pro- [ 
I 
cedure that it be completed in an expeditious manner. As a ( 
I 
result of that investigation, we supplemented the condition of | 
our approval with the requirement that UUP should in practice j 
complete its actual refund process for its 1977-78 fiscal year 
by January 31, 1980, and the refund process for later fiscal years j 
1 / ' I 
by. August 31 of the. year, following the refund application. Thus ; 
1/ Judicial enforcement of this order has been obtained, but fur- \ 
ther relief in regard to the 1977-78 refund proceeding should 
properly be the subject of a new improper practice charge„ 
-After confirmation of our order (UUP v„ Newman 77 AD2d 709, 
Iv. to app„ deiio 51 NY2d 707) an enforcement order was obtained 
from Supreme Court, Albany County on April 29, 1981, after the 
completion of UUP's 1977-78 refund proceeding in June, 1980„ 
It may be noted that in that case, Judge Cholakis concluded 
that the Board could conduct a compliance investigation of its j 
prior order, but could not consider whether UUP had maintained f 
a proper refund procedure unless a new charge was filed j 
(UUP v." Newman, 12 PERB'17013 (Supreme Court, Albany County, | 
July 23,~T9797l. I 
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we passed only on the structural adequacy of the procedure as 
S 
designed. Unlike that case, the issue raised by the charge here-
in is whether the fime it actually took to complete the refund j 
proceeding, under the basic design, for the 1977-78 fiscal year -
approximately 22 months - constituted interference with this j 
-charging:-par-tjAs:-xights-„- -Not--only-^ s—this—is^ sue—mo-t—ideia-tiG3.-l------l-
I 
to that considered in our prior case, but if we were to determine! 
that the length of time taken by UUP to implement and complete 
its refund procedure interfered with Barry's rights in violation 
of CSL §209-ao2(a), this charge could properly be the basis for 
appropriate remedial action not incorporated in our prior order„ i 
Since the basis for this charge is, therefore, not a 
claimed violation of our prior order, we conclude that the chargej 
in this respect is timely, having been filed within four months 
of the date of completion of the refund procedure, i0e., the 
I 
issuance of the neutral's decision„ 
! 
Accordingly, we shall remand this proceeding to the hearing 
officer for the holding of a hearing and
 taking of evidence in 
regard to Item 2 of the charge „' If a violation is found to have 
occurred, we would then consider what remedial action is 
warranted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we order that 
1. With respect'to the aspect of the charge relating 
to the length of time taken to complete the refund 
procedure, the matter is remanded to the hearing 
Board - U-4775 -9 
20 
officer for action consistent with this decision, 
and 
In all other respects the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed„ 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 17, 1981 
larold Ro Newman, Chairman 
•%**L\fc**U+^ 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C „' Ran d i e ' s , Mepafo'er 
im 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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I n t h e M a t t e r of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC. , ' 
R e s p o n d e n t , BOARD DECISION AND 
, : ORDER 
- a n d - • 
THOMAS C. BARRY, : CASE NO'. U-4983' 
Charging Party„ 
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of Counsel), for Respondent 
THOMAS Co BARRY, pro se 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of both the charging 
party (Barry) and the respondent (UUP) to a hearing officer's 
decision which dismissed in part and sustained in part an 
improper practice charge against the respondent„ No hearing 
was held since the hearing officer concluded that the pleadings 
presented no factual dispute. 
UUP is the certified bargaining agent for the unit which 
includes Barry. He, as a non-member of UUP, pays agency fees 
to UUP pursuant to CSL §203„3(a). Barry applied for and. 
received a refund for the 1978-79 fiscal year. He pursued the 
appellate steps of UUP's refund procedure, but when notified of 
the date and place of the hearing before the neutral - the last 
step in such procedure - he abandoned the refund procedure and 
on October 6, 1980,filed the instant improper practice charge. 
li 
i 
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That charge alleged in general terms that UUP's refund procedure, 
as implemented in regard to UUP's 1978-79 fiscal year, was 
"grossly coercive, burdensome, unlawful and inadequate", thus |' 
constituting an improper practice within the meaning of CSL 
§209-a.2(a). His charge also alleged that the amount refunded 
"tor- hrimrfor "the:: 19 78•-7 9" "f"i^'c^l^ye^r-wa"^'n"6~t~ c'orT"ec t"", "ftlrso-"", ~ 
constituting an improper practice in violation of CSL §209-a-o'2(a) „ 
As clarified by particularization, required pursuant to 
§ 204 „ 3(b) of this Board's Rules, and at a conference and by I 
I 
subsequent correspondence, the hearing officer construed the 
charge as setting forth the following bases for alleging that 
UUP committed improper practices: 
I 1. The UUP refund procedure for 1978-79 was j 
not completed by August 31, 1980; | 
2„ UUP has not refunded monies used for in- \ 
surance benefits during 1978-79; .' 1 
3o UUP has not provided adequate financial 
information for its expenditures and the 
expenditures of its affiliates for 
1978-79; 
4o The appointment of the neutral by UUP 
is improper; 
5. The amount refunded for 1978-79 is in-
adequate; | 
i 
6o The date and site of the hearing before | 
the neutral were improperly selected„ 
The hearing officer dismissed all of these- allegations 
except the last on the ground that each such issue had previously 
been decided by the Board„ She sustained that aspect of the ( 
! 
i 
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charge relating to the selection of the date and site of the 
hearing by the neutral. The neutral determined that a single 
hearing would be held for all objectors on October 6, 1980,in 
Syracuse since that was the area in which most of the agency fee ! 
objectors then resided. Barry lives and works in the Buffalo 
area, approximately 150 miles from Syracuse. Barry did not 
attend this hearing because of the time and expense involved. ! 
• 
The hearing officer concluded that the scheduling of the hearing 
at.one location had a chilling effect on agency fee objectors 
and that such action was coercive and in violation of §209-a.2(a) 
of the Act since it was done pursuant to UUP' s refund procedure., 
Barry excepted to the dismissal of a portion of his charge„ 
He argues that the hearing officer did not properly construe his \ 
"particularization" of his charge. He urges that issues of fact 
do indeed remain and should have been the* subject of a hearing. j 
He also urges that elements of his charge are not covered by j 
any Board decision and should not have been dismissed on that I 
ground. - \ 
UUP excepts to sustaining of that aspect of the charge : j 
relating to the neutral's selection of the time and place for j 
hearing.. It relies upon that provision of UUP' s refund procedure 
which states "the union, at its option, may consolidate all 
objection's and have them resolved at one hearing to be held for 
that purpose". UUP notes that this provision was included in 
the procedures accepted by ,the Board in UUP Eson , 11 PERB 113074. 
Board - U-4983 -4 
It also excepts to the remedy recommended by the hearing officer 
which is that UUP refund to Barry all agency fees collected from 
him for 1978-79 with interest at 6%„ 
• DISCUSSION 
We_.dp .not agree . in allrespects with the hearing officer's 
interpretation of Barry's particularization of his charge. 
Having originally alleged that the UUP's refund procedure was 
"coercive, burdensome, unlawful and inadequate", Barry was 
properly required to specify in what respect this was so, 
without simply relying, on a recitation of facts concerning the 
refund proceeding for the 1978-79 fiscal year„ In response, 
Barry - not represented at any time by an attorney - submitted 
a document which attempted to particularize separately each of 
the 'words; quoted, above, •frpm.hisf-pharge.
 : .. 
Under the heading "unlawful" he asserted a violation of our 
order in UUP (Eson) 12.PERB 13093 - a failure to complete the 
procedure by August 31, 1980; a violation of our order in 
UUP (Eson) 12 PERB 1f3117 - a failure to refund monies used, 
for insurance benefits; a violation of the hearing officer's 
order in UUP (Barry) 13 PERB 114541 - a failure to provide 
adequate financial information at the time of refund (apparently 
failing to recognize that this order was modified by our 
final ..order. in„ the proceeding) ; - and a failure; to, give an. 
adequate refund for the year 1978-79„ 
Under the heading "coercive", he stated that the 1978-79 
appeals process had "so far" taken 15 months and that "the 
Board - U-4983 -5 
net effect of this dilatory procedure is to discourage anyone 
from pursuing such an appeals process"; that the failure to 
provide financial information also discourages the exercise of 
rights under the Taylor Law; that the effect of the entire 
procedure is to coerce him into becoming a member; and that UUP's | 
-soiev--r-ig-ht-t0-seleat- and---p-ay--for--^ he-neut^ ai---is--des^ r-ucti:ve-of^ - --| 
his rights„ Under "burdensome", he' complains of the "incredible J 
length and complexity" of the refund procedure and the selection j 
of the hearing site by the neutral. Under "inadequate" he com- ! 
plains of the inadequate-refund and of the "complete absence of 
fairness" of the procedures0 
In our view, Barry's charge in this case raises the same 
issue with regard to the length of time taken to implement and 
complete the 1978-79 refund procedure as he raised in regard to 
the 1977-78 refund in Case No. U-4775 - UUP and Barry, decided 
by us concurrently with this case. For the reasons set forth in 
our decision in that case, we conclude that this aspect of the 
charge may be considered and should therefore be remanded for 
hearing and decision in conjunction with the hearing on the charg 
in Case No. U-4775. If a violation is found to have occurred, we 
i 
would then consider what remedial action is warranted. j 
! 
In regard to that aspect of the charge herein relating to \ 
the failure to provide financial information at the time of the j 
I 
1978-79 refund, we have previously considered Barry's complaint j 
relating to the specific issue (UUP (Barry), 13 PERB 13090) and, | 
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for the reasons set forth in our prior decision, we declined to 
order UUP to furnish the information for the 1978-79 refund,, . ! 
Accordingly, the hearing officer properly dismissed this part of 
the charge on the basis of that decision. 
I 
Barry's present complaint regarding UUP's purported | 
i 
failure: to-refund^ 
specifically to our decision and order in UUP (Esoh) 12 PERB j 
13117 and future enforcement of that order„ The hearing officer 
properly dismissed this aspect of his charge„ 
That part of Barry's charge which consists of allegations 
that the amount of refund for 1978-79 was inadequate or 
i 
incorrect was properly dismissed on the basis of our decision in 
1 
Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB•f3018. 
We also agree that Barry's challenge to the procedure | 
whereby the neutral is selected and compensated by UUP without j 
•. i 
participation by the objector should be dismissed since the 
precise question was'dealt'with by us when .we; .approved-the - . 
procedure (UUP (Eson) 11 PEPvB 1(3074) and we are not persuaded 
that this procedure is unreasonable so long as the objector j 
• i 
retains the right to initiate a plenary action regarding the I 
amount of the refund as determined by the neutral party„ j 
We reverse the hearing officer's finding of merit to that \ 
part of Barry's charge which alleges that the selection of the 
site of the hearing by the neutral was coercive„ As we have j 
| 
concluded in Case No, U-4775, complaints concerning the conduct [ 
! 
and rulings of the neutral are properly to be dealt with, if at 
i 
r
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all, in the plenary court action available to objectors, as 
they are essentially a part of the challenge to the correctness 
of the amount of the refund (see' UUP (Eson) 11 PERB 1f3074 and . 
Hampton Bays Teachers Association 14 PERB 13018). 
Accordingly, we shall remand this proceeding for the holding 
of a hearing and taking of evidence in regard to that aspect of 
the charge relating to the length of time taken to complete the 
refund procedure. In light of this decision, we do not adopt 
the hearing officer's recommended remedy„ 
NOW, THEREFORE, we order that 
1. With respect to the aspect of the charge relating 
to the length of time taken to complete the refund 
procedure, the matter is remanded to the hearing 
officer for action consistent with this decision, 
and 
2. -In all other respects the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December -17,..1981 
Albany, New York 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ 8 ^ ^ /C^t^^a— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
;•"• 7 $ 
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//2F-12/18/81 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK and SECURITY AND LAW .. 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT COUNCIL 
82, AFSCME, 
Respondents, 
-:_-:.._-__-!..•_..._.-. _"_^_:.......:. -and" -- :.:.__•_..:_._ ..." 
THOMAS J. DUNBAR, 
Charging Party. 
MORGAN, MELHUISH, MONAGHAN AND MEYER, ESQS., 
for Charging Party 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ.-, (FLORENCE T. FRAZER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent, State of New York 
ROWLEY AND FORREST, ESQS., for Respondent, Security 
and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 
82, AFSCME 
The charge herein was filed by Thomas J. Dunbar against both 
the State of New York (State) and Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME (DC 82). It alleges that 
the State brought a disciplinary action against him in retaliation 
for his having filed an earlier improper practice charge against 
it. It further alleges that DC 82 did not provide him with a 
copy of the award of the arbitrator in the disciplinary proceeding 
which found merit in the disciplinary charge.— This matter comes 
to us on the exceptions of Dunbar to a hearing officer's decision 
— The charge had also alleged that DC 82 had failed to represent 
Dunbar properly in the disciplinary proceeding. This part of 
the charge is insufficient in that no facts are alleged that 
might constitute an improper practice. In any event, Dunbar's 
exceptions do not deal with this part of his charge. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4868 
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dismissing his charge on the ground that it was not timely filed. 
The charge herein was filed July 31, 1980. The record shows 
that the State served a notice of discipline upon Dunbar on 
September 28, 1979. A disciplinary arbitration proceeding was 
then held in which Dunbar was represented by DC 82. The arbitra-
tion awar d-wa s-i s sued- on January- 18-,- 198 0.-; -I t h e Id - that Dunbar 
was guilty of the charges contained in the notice of discipline 
and that the penalty of discharge was appropriate. He was 
terminated that same day. The process of Dunbar's termination 
was completed on February 14, 1980, when he appeared at the 
regional headquarters office of the State's Office of Parks and 
Recreation to return equipment that had been issued to him. 
Dunbar spoke to DC 82's field representative on,February 2, 
1980, about the arbitration award/and complained that he had not 
received a copy of it. The field representative promised to send 
2/ Dunbar a copy of the award and testified that he did so.— 
We affirm the determination of the hearing officer that the 
charge herein was not timely filed. The alleged violation of the 
State occurred on or about September 28, 1979, and was known to 
Dunbar at that time. The alleged violation of DC 82 was known 
to Dunbar on February 2, 1980. Assuming that Dunbar could have 
reasonably anticipated that DC 82 would send him a copy of the 
arbitration award after February 2, 1980, it would have been 
unreasonable.for him to hold to that expectation for more than a 
— The evidence presented by the parties raises a question as to 
whether DC 82 actually furnished a copy of the arbitration award 
to Dunbar. In view of our determination that Dunbar's charge 
was not timely, it is unnecessary to reach this question. 
Board - U-4868 
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few days and it would have been even more unreasonable for him to 
continue waiting after the process of his termination by the 
State was completed on February 14, 1980. Nevertheless, he did 
not file the charge herein until some ten months following the 
alleged violation by the State and some five and one-half months 
following ~ t h ^ ^ 
our Rules provides, however, that a charge may be filed only'within 
four months of the conduct complained about. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, DISMISSED, 
DATED: December 17, 1981 
Albany., New York 
&*r*te?>n^' 
Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM : :BOARD''DECISION 
.ON' REMAND 
Upon the Application for Designation of .._.... -
Persons as Managerial or Confidential : L a s e J°^J±JJ±:Lk 
PAUL A. FEIGENBAUM, ESQ. (MICHAEL COLODNER, ESQ., j 
and NORMA MEACHAM CROTTY, ESQ., of Counsel), j 
for the State of New York | 
ROEMER and FEATEERSTONHAUGH (STEPHEN J. WILEY, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for CSEA 
i 
BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, SLAVIN & GARLEY | 
(JAMES P. DOLLARD, JR., ESQ., of Counsel), j 
for the Law Assistants Association of the I 
City of New York j 
On September 12, 1977, the Unified Court System of the State 
j 
of New York, through its Office of Court Administration (OCA), j 
I filed an application seeking the designation of many of its j 
1 
employees, including those'in titles of Law Assistant and Law j 
Clerk, as managerial or confidential. After certain .intermediate 
proceedings and dispositions; not herein at issue, the Director of j 
i 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed 
I 
the application, finding, in relevant part, that law assistants 
and law clerks do not "formulate policy", and thus do not warrant j 
1! 
I 
designation as managerial under §201„7(a)(i) of the Taylor Law„ 
~i 
In this regard, the Director held that policy formulation is the j 
province of administrative employees of the Unified Court System, \ 
such as the Chief Judge and Chief Administrator. He dismissed f 
j 
OCA's claim that judges make "policy" within the meaning of j 
7248 
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§201.7(a)(i) when they render court decisions and that law assis- j 
! 
tants and law clerks "formulate" such policy by advising and j 
assisting the judges in the performance of that function,, j 
Upon the exceptions of OCA to the Director's decision, we 
affirmed the dismissal of the application. We did not, however, 
-find-it--neeessar-^ ^^  
when they issue decisions. We held that even were that the case, 
the technical professional help provided them by the law clerks I 
I 
and law assistants, as delineated in the record before us, did ] 
not likewise amount to policy formulation. j 
OCA appealed our decision to the Supreme Court, Albany J 
County. By decision dated November 5, 1981, that Court, by 
Justice Pitt, found that since the record indicated that law 
assistants and law clerks advise and make recommendations to 
judges, they have "meaningful participation in the decisional 
process," thereby satisfying our definition of the term "-formulate?', 
as previously set out in State of New York, 5 PERB 1(3001 at 3005 [ 
(1975) . The Court therefore remanded the proceeding to us- for a j 
determination as to whether a judicial decision in an action or ) 
proceeding constitutes the formulation of "policy",, 
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 
In its exceptions and supporting brief, OCA advances three 
i 
arguments. First, it contends that under the Board's "traditional?' 
s 
definition of policy as set out in State of New York, judicial 
decisions amount to "policy" decisions within the meaning of [ 
§201.7(a)(i)„ Next, it argues that the exclusion; of judges fromj I 
» 
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the Taylor Law definition of "public employee" represents a 
legislative conclusion that judges make "policy" and are thereby 
i 
r 
managerial. Finally, OCA contends that judicial decisions in j 
public employment litigation create public employment policy, and j 
that a strong appearance of impropriety exists where employees | 
I 
-whoj/-a^e^-UTi±on-.--mem^ •-- :..-.-.•- -.-~-..--.-.._ -.---_-^.:..-:_: ,_._.!r:_._--. 
Both the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) and] 
the Law Assistants Association of the City of New York (LAA) filed] 
briefs in opposition to OCA's exceptions. Both contend that 
"policy" for purposes of §201.7(a)(i) refers to administrative 
decisions designed to accomplish the overall objectives or mission 
j 
of a government, such as those made by the Chief Judge and Chief 
Administrator of the Courts. Both assert that the Legislature did 
not conclude that judges are "managerial" policy-makers under the j 
Taylor Law, but, instead excluded them from the definition of j 
"public employee" for public policy reasons. Addressing OCA's 
third contention, LAA argues that it lacks substance and is based 
upon the invalid assumption that the employees at issue create 
' • 
public policy. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the Director's conclusion that judges do not make 
"policy" within the meaning of §201.7(a)(i) of the Taylor Law 
when they render- decisions in court actions and proceedings. j 
} 
Consequently, we hold that the advisory role of law assistants and) 
law clerks in the decisional process does not make.them formulators 
! 
of policy entitled to designation as managerial under that j 
7251 1 i 
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statutory provision. 
This Board has consistently held that "policy" decisions are [ 
those which shape and define an employer's overall operation, I 
I direction and objectives in furtherance of its institutional 
mission. In State of New York, 5 PERB 13001 (1975), this Board | 
Jield-j:ha± .:.:: :^ ---^ ::^  ^  
I 
"In government, policy would thus be the develop-- | 
ment of the particular objectives of a government 
or agency thereof.in the fulfillment of its mission j 
and the method, means andr extent of achieving such •{ 
objectives„" 
I 
More recently, in City of Bihghamton, 12 PERB 1f3099 (1979) ,. we | 
. j 
reaffirmed this ..definitions :''-.. 
"To formulate policy is to participate with j 
regularity in the essential process involving j 
the determination1 of the goals and objectives I 
of the government involved and of the methods j 
for accomplishing those goals: and objectives 
that have a substantial impact upon the affairs i 
and the constituency of the government." j 
The mission of the Unified Court System may fairly be I 
described as the administration and implementation of a system or 
! 
s t ruc ture by which j u d i c i a l business can b e ' e f f i c i e n t l y dispatched 
I 
and justice thereby served. Decisions regarding the methods of | 
accomplishing this mission, are, as the Director found, vested by 
Article 6, Section 28 of the State Constitution and Article 7-A 
of the Judiciary Law in the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, 
the Chief Administrator of the courts, the Administrative Board of J 
the Courts, the Judicial Conference, and certain of their 
I 
designees. Indeed, Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law contains a 
lengthy list of subjects in regard to which "the chief judge, 
after consultation with the administrative board, shall establish ! 
! 
! 
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standards and administrative, policies for general application to 
the unified court system throughout the state. . . . It contains aj 
similarly detailed list of the chief administrator's functions as 
supervisor of the "administration and operation of the unified 
2/ 
court systemT. Related functions and powers are prescribed for 
3/ 
the administrative board and the judicial conference. Decisions 
made with regard to these subjects and in furtherance of these 
powers amount to "policy" formulation within the meaning of 
Section 201,7(a)(i). These decisions provide the institutional 
framework within which the daily business of the judiciary is 
conducted. In large measure, the work of the judges, including 
their issuance of decisions in actions and proceedings,.is that 
daily business. Judges are directly engaged in the judicial 
process and as such their work is the lifeblood of the courts. 
The. decisions, they, render,, however, are not "policy" decisions 
• 1/ .:.Among these aire •.policies' and-: standards .relating .to' "the dls-
patch of judicial business", "the adoption. „ „ and implementation' 
...of rules' and .orders '•regulating. ;pr;actice ''and. procedure in the 
courts", "administrative methods and systems of the unified j 
court system", "the examination of the operation of the courts j 
and the state of their dockets and the investigation of i 
< criticisms and recommendations". See Judiciary Law §211. 
2/ Among these functions are to "prepare the itemized estimates of 
the annual financial needs of the unified court system", 
"establish the hours, terms and parts of court, assign judges 
and justices to them, and make necessary rules therefor", 
"make recommendations to thelegislature and the governor for 
laws and programs to improve the administration of justice and j 
the operation of the unified court system", "promote cooperatioii 
and coordination between the unified court system and other 
agencies of the state or its political subdivisions", "estab- [ 
lish educational programs„.„for the judicial and non-judicial [ 
personnel of the unified court system", "promulgate rules of j 
conduct for judges and justices", "adopt rules and orders j 
regulating practice in the courts". See Judiciary Law §212. j 
3/ See Judiciary Law §§213 and 214, 
7253 
! 
Board - E-0411 -6 j 
within the-meaning of; the. Taylor-Law but 'rather, the ••ultimate work j 
product of the", court system.' The 'overall operation and direction I 
I' 
of the court" system is-.not shaped by. judicial interpretations of j j 
procedural and substantive law in day to day litigation. j 
We also reject OCA's contention that the exclusion of judges 
I 
_from the definition of "public employee" in §201.7 represents a } 
I legislative conclusion that judges are managerial by virtue of j 
i | 
their decision-making function. When the Legislature wished to 
deem particular employees "managerial" it did so specifically.-
Thus, paragraphs (b) and (c) of §201.7 designate assistant 
attorneys general, assistant district attorneys, certain fire 
department personnel and others as "managerial" employees. 
Questions as to the managerial status of most other employees were] 
left to be resolved by PERB in accordance with the criteria . set 
out in §201.7(a) (i) and (il)'„ As regards judges and justices of 
• 
the Unified Court System, however, the Legislature neither desig-
nated them "managerial", nor left the question of such 
designation to PERB. Instead, judges and justices, along with 
persons in the state militia and those who do not hold their 
• 
positions by "appointment" and "employment", e.g., elected 
officials, were simply excluded from the definition of "public 
employee" without any regard to "managerial" status. These per- j' 
sons were denied collective negotiation rights for public policy i 
reasons, and' hot because the Legislature believed judicial 
decisions constitute "policy" within the meaning of §201„7, I 
i 
Finally, OCA's contention that an appearance of impropriety 
S 
! 
may arise should unionized law assistants and clerks work on public 
\ 
employment cases raises a public policy question which can only bej 
I \ i! 
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addressed by the Legislature. As a public policy argument it is 
similar in nature, although not necessarily in fact, to that which 
caused the Legislature to exclude judges and justices from the 
definition of "public employee" without regard to managerial 
considerations. Whatever its merit, the argument is not relevant i 
to —the -StatutorTy:--cri.ter:ia_:this.::Boa.rd-.musJ:___£ollowinimaking^ ___;.__:____ i 
i 
! 
managerial designations„ As we have already stated hereinabove, \ 
\ 
i 
judicial decisions, whether in the area of public employment 
law or any other subject area, do not constitute "policy" 
decisions within the meaning of §201„7(a)(i). 
NOW, THEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Director and 
WE ORDER that the application for the designation of law 
assistants and law clerks as managerial or confidential be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 18, 1981 
^Z+LJ2^ A? fte~~^ &>te~L, 
arold R„ Newman, Chairman 
"David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2H-I2/18/8] 
In the Matter of 
EAST MORICHES TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND. ORDER 
CASE' NO. D-0226 
MARTIN L. BARR, Esq., (JEROME THIER, Esq., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, Esq. (RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, Esq. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
On October 22, 1981, Martin L. Barr, Counsel to this Board, 
filed a charge alleging that the East Moriches Teachers Associ-
ation, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Respondent) had violated Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encour-
aged, condoned and engaged in a strike against the East Moriches 
Union Free School District on September 9, 10 and 11, 1981. The 
charge further alleges that on said dates, approximately 31 
employees in a negotiating unit consisting of approximately 34 
professional teachers and teaching assistants participated in 
the strike. 
The respondent did not file an answer, thus admitting all 
of the allegations of the charge, upon the understanding that 
l i 
Board - D-0226 -2 
the charging party would recommend, and this Board would accept, 
a penalty of loss of its dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges to the extent of forty percent (40%) of the amount 
which would otherwise be deducted during a year.— The charging 
party has so recommended. 
--"-" ^
:
 ~ 0 ^ ' 
respondent violated CSL §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that all dues deduction privileges 
of the East Moriches Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
and agency shop fee deduction privileges, if any, be suspended, 
commencing on the first practicable date, and continuing for 
such period of time during which forty percent (40%) of its 
annual dues and any agency shop fees would otherwise be 
deducted. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop fees shall be 
deducted on its behalf by the East Moriches Union Free School 
District until the East Moriches Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
1/ This is intended to be the equivalent of a five-month 
suspension of the privileges of dues and agency shop fee 
deductions, if any, if such were withheld in twelve monthly 
installments throughout the year. In fact, the annual dues 
of the respondent are not deducted in this manner. 
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AFT, AFL-CIO, affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government, as required by the provisions 
of CSL §210.3(g). 
Dated: Albany, New York 
December 17, 1981 
-^X^L^£ //^ 
'-ew~**^*<± 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C3S&L /C£dL"C<^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
CJ4SSJ 
David C, Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
• • • • #21-12/18/81 
In the Matter of the Application of the 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
for a determination pursuant to Section 
212 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
• ORDER 
DOCKET NO. S-0016 
i 
on the 18th day of December, 1981, and after consideration of \ 
j 
the application of the City of-Syracuse made pursuant to Section \ 
l 
212 of the Civil Service Law for a determination that Chapter 30 \ 
of the Revised General Ordinances of the City of Syracuse as j 
last amended by General Ordinance No. 40-1981 is substantially j 
! 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in j 
•\ 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the State 
\ 
and to the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations I 
! 
Board, it is - j 
i 
ORDERED, that said application be, and the same hereby is, ( 
I 
approved upon the determination of the Board that the Ordinance \ 
i 
aforementioned, as amended, is substantially equivalent to the j 
provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civil j 
Service Law with respect to the State and to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board. . j 
I 
i 
a 
Dated: Albany, New York | 
December 18, 1981 
'HXROL'D ET'ffEWMAN, Chalrmari*^^" 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
• • In the Matter of 
\\ COBLESKILL CENTRAL'• SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
^ • 
i • 
;• Employer, 
j; . -and-
:
;
 COBLESKILL UNITED TEACHERS, NYSUT/AFT, 
';'. Petitioner, 
j' -and-
!; COBLESKILL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYEA/NEA, 
;• Intervenor. 
#3A-12/18/81 
Case No. C-2323 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
_j-j::-i_^ij-;_A;-_repres_&nfeatiori proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act,' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that ' 
Cobleskill Teachers Association, NYEA/NEA • 
has been designated and selected.by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. • •-
Unit: Included: Full-time, certified classroom teachers; less than full-' 
time, certified classroom teachers; librarians; school 5 
nurse teachers; guidance counselors and administrative) 
assistant to the elementary principal. s; 
Excluded: Chief school administrator; school business admin- } 
istrator; middle school and high school administrators;! 
elementary school administrators j•.director: of guidance; 
and pupil-personnel'services; itinerant substitute I 
teachers !' 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with - ' . ' ' . ' ' . 
Cobleskill Teachers Association., NYEA/NEA 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to. terms and conditions of employment,• and shall 
;negotiate collectively with such employee organization'in the 
•determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 18th day of December, 1981 
• Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C7P*A-S AZ&rfst^L— 
?ERB 58.3. 
David C. Randies,. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I' In the Matter of .' 
!; COUNTY OF ALBANY (ALBANY COUNTY NURSING 
i; HOME' AND ANN LEE HOME) , 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 2 0 0 , GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES' 
UNION, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
#3B-12/18/81 
C a s e No. C-2305 
CERTIFICATION.OF REPRESENTATIVE AND.ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
Local 200, General Service Employees' Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit:' Included: Full-time and regular part-time employees in 
the following titles: registered professional 
nurse, employee health services nurse, patient 
care coordinator., rehabilitation registered 
nurse 
Excluded: All other employees 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with 
Local 200, General Service Employees' Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO-
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 18th day of December 
Albany, New York 
1981 
flarold R. Newman, Chai rman 
PERB 5 8 . 2 
<^U / c ^ ~ c ^ 
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